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Incentive  
Through the course Philosophy and Science I was introduced to Kant’s 
objection to the ontological argument regarding whether “existence” can be used 
as a predicate and through that we were briefly introduced to Anselm’s 
argument. At the time the focus was on Kant and therefore my knowledge of 
Anselm was somewhat limited. However limited it might have been, it sparked 
an interest. I became more and more curious as to how Anselm’s argument was 
constructed and wanted to know more of this, at first glance, simple, but in 
reality very deceptive argument. I thought that it would be interesting to do a 
critical reading of Anselm’s argument by using Kant’s objections. 
However it would also be very interesting to do a critical reading of the 
argument and use a logic-based approach that would make it possible to assert 
whether or not the argumentation is faulty or not. By working this way with the 
argument it is also possible for me to see what kind of literary devise Anselm 
uses to create the argument. This could be done by using either Toulmin or 
Fisher. 
Problem area 
Throughout this project the focus will be on whether or not Anselm’s argument 
is sound and valid given that the argument revolves around God’s existence, 
something which is not possible to irrevocably prove or dismiss.  
Given that I cannot irrevocably prove or refute God’s existence, the project will 
focus on faulty argumentation if there is any of the kind.  
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I can see possible problems with some of the assumptions in the argument, and 
how these assumptions might corrupt whether the argument is sound or not. In 
the situations where the assumptions occur, I would have to decide whether the 
assumption is asserted. In given situations I will need to use the Assertibility 
Question where one has to ask oneself what argument or evidence would justify 
me in asserting the conclusion. If I find that the author asserts or assumes, 
shown clearly in the text in a reasonable way, then I may deem the assumption 
valid and continue the analysis of the argument. If not, then there is no way to 
continue the analysis in any rational way – if the analysis is supposed to be 
purely based on the text (The logic of real arguments, p. 22)  
All of these problems are part of the argument and through the use of logic and 
Fisher’s approach they will hopefully be solved or at least explained.   
 
Delimitation 
This project was initially supposed to be more like Kant versus Anselm, but the 
more time I spend reading Anselm’s argument, the more interested I got in 
regard to the soundness of the argument itself and not so much the critique that 
Kant offered regarding Anselm’s argument. I started to revisit the Toulmin 
model and the tools that we were given during both the Philosophy and Science 
and Text and Sign courses. Those teachings helped form the project. I decided to 
analyse the argument presented in Proslogion using the Toulmin model, but 
soon after I realised that the model would not be able to contain such a complex 
argument. However Alec Fisher’s approach is much more able to contain the 
complexity of the argument, so that none of the argument gets lost in the 
analysis.  
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Whereas with Toulmin I would only be able to work with three sections of the 
argument, Fisher’s approach enables me to work with the entire second chapter 
thus giving me a possibility to find all of the nuances in the argument. By using 
Fisher’s approach I will single out every reason and intermediate conclusion, 
and see if the final conclusion in Anselm’s argument follows from reasons. 
In choosing to work solely with Fisher, Anselm and a few selected premises, I 
chose not to introduce Kant or make this a historical/religious project, nor do I 
intent to include Toulmin’s model of argument. 
In the analysis I have only included the relevant sections of the argument, 
however the analysis of the other sections are available in the appendix, as they 
speak to the context of the argument. 
 
Problem definition 
Is Anselm’s ontological argument valid? 
If so is it sound? 
 
Theory 
Presentation of Alec Fisher and his approach 
Alec Fisher is a renowned philosopher and mathematician.  He used to teach at 
the University of East Anglia. Fisher wanted to give the students an approach to 
arguments that equipped them to decipher more complex arguments than the 
classic and short examples usually used in the field. That led to the book The 
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logic of real arguments, where Fisher shows how to break down a complex and 
comprehensive argument to find out whether or not it is valid and sound.  
Fisher’s approach is all about finding the inference indicators or any indicators 
there may be hidden in the context, in order to get the essential components 
from the text. There are different kinds of indicators, since there are different 
things worth finding in the argument, such as conclusion indicators, hypothetical 
indicators, reason indicators and supposition indicators. As one can deduce from 
their titles each of them indicates that a conclusion, reason, hypothesis or 
supposition is coming in the text. They help the reader circle out the important 
and crucial points that are put forward in the text. However it is important to 
note that it is not all words or phrases that necessarily constitute as an indicator, 
even though they are on the list of indicator words and phrases. There is not 
always an indicator sometimes the only way to find the reasons are through the 
context of the argument. 
After having found all of the essential parts of the argument, one is able to start 
mapping out the argument in a diagram. It is done by following five steps that 
guides you through every step of the way. From finding inference indicators, to 
identifying which kind of indicators there are present and how to find reasons 
when there are not any indicators. To find the final conclusion, though there 
may be more than one. From there on it is just a matter of back-tracking the 
logic, starting from the final conclusion and repeating the step until there are no 
more immediately reasons left. Leaving only basic reason, completed strings of 
immediate reasons and the final conclusion, all of which should end up being a 
map of how the argument is put together.  
In regards to validity, it is determined by whether or not the conclusion follows 
from the premises. As long as the conclusion follows from the premises the 
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argument is valid. However that does not necessarily mean that the argument is 
sound. In order to deem an argument sound it must be valid and all premises 
must be true.  
 
Presentation of Anselm and his ontological argument 
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) was a Benedictine monk, who created 
philosophical and theological works. One of his works, Proslogion, will be used 
in this project. Proslogion consists of Proslogion, Pro Insipiente and Responsio, 
which are the original text (Proslogion), the critique of the original text (Pro 
Insipiente) and Anselm’s response to the critique (Responsio). In this project I 
will be analysing sections from Proslogion, which I will do using with Fisher’s 
approach. The part of Proslogion, which the project will focus on, is the second 
chapter, where the reader is introduced to Anselm’s ontological argument. 
Though God is not identified as X in chapter two, he is however identified as 
God in the following chapters. I will refer to X, instead of “something than 
which nothing greater can be thought”.  
Anselm’s ontological argument, the proof of God’s existence, is the main focus 
in this project. Though it might seem simple at first glance, it is far from simple. 
Every word in the argument is carefully chosen and carries a certain meaning in 
regard to the argument. However, Anselm’s argument has been interpreted many 
times, and therefore there are many versions, some translated by people who 
support Anselm’s argument, and some versions translated by people who 
disagree with Anselm’s argument.  
A simplified version of the argument goes like this: 
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 In our understanding X is a being than which nothing greater can be 
thought. 
 Therefore the notion of X exists in the mind. 
 However a being that exists both in the mind and in reality is greater 
than a being that exists merely in the mind. 
 If X merely exists in the mind, it is possible to think of a being greater 
than X, since that being would exist in reality. 
 Nevertheless, we cannot think of anything greater than X. 
 Hence, God exists.  
Due to the fact that the argument is regarding the existence of God and is written 
by a monk in a time in history where religion played a major part in the scholar 
community, makes it rather interesting to see whether or not Anselm is 
influenced by his own beliefs in the argumentation. What also played a 
significant role in the scholar community at the time was rhetoric, and thereby 
also reasoning or argumentation. In order to fully understand the argument the 
reader needs to understand the premises in the argument.  
Anselm’s argument is written as a prayer, and yet God is not the only audience 
to whom the text is directed. Another receiver is the reader, in this case 
represented by the fool. The argument is supposed to prove to the fool that God 
indeed does exist. Anselm tries to show this through an argument based on 
logic. 
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Method 
Given that Toulmin’s approach is not able to sustain the entire argument, one 
would have to choose three sections and work with them accordingly. 
Fisher’s approach to analysing arguments is much more functional when it 
comes to arguments as complex as Anselm’s. This approach also enables me to 
work with Anselm’s argument as a whole, and therefore not having to split the 
argument into sections, as I would have to do if I were to use Toulmin’s 
approach.  
All of the different approaches to the argument would be interesting projects that 
in their own way would shed light on Anselm’s argument. However this project 
I will be using Fisher’s approach to a logical argument, which is presented by 
Anselm in form of his ontological argument Proslogion. In this chapter the 
method of this project will be outlined and when needed explained.   
One of the important factors of this approach is language and how it is used in 
regard to reasoning. Throughout the argument there are words that indicate what 
is to follow, whether it is a conclusion, reason or assumption. However it is 
important to mention that even though these words might be present in the text, 
they might not serve as inference indicators. So sometimes indicator-words are 
just everyday-words, and sometimes there will not be any inference indicators at 
all. If that is the case the attention should be directed to the context of the 
argument, since that might tell the reader what the purpose with the section 
might be.  
The structure of the reasoning is also of importance to the argument. Reasons 
can appear both independently and jointly. If they appear jointly, it is only 
together that they support the conclusion, and if they were to be separated they 
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would not be able to support the conclusion. With the independently reasons 
they can support the conclusion standing alone. They do not need the support 
that the jointly reasons do. There might also appear an intermediate conclusion; 
this intermediate conclusion may function as a reason to the final conclusion. An 
intermediate conclusion occurs when the author gradually needs to prove points 
in order to reach the final conclusion. 
By creating a diagram it is possible to get a better comprehension of how the 
argument is put together. The diagram gives a visual point of view, where you 
literally can see the argument, step by step.  
The way to use the knowledge above is just a matter of following five steps 
presented by Fisher from The logic of real arguments: 
1. Read the text just to get the feel of it, meanwhile circling all the 
inference indicators as you go. 
2. Then, underline any conclusions that are clearly indicated, and bracket 
any reasons that are clearly indicated.  
3. Identify the main conclusion or conclusions.  
4. Then you start from your main conclusion, from there you find the 
immediate reasons in the text that leads you to accept you main 
conclusion. From there you backtrack till the immediate reason is 
sufficiently supported by reasons. 
5. For each immediate reason there might be to the main conclusion, you 
repeat step nr. 4, until there is only basic reasons left. Then you put 
your findings into either a linear form or a diagram. (The logic of real 
arguments, p. 22-23) 
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This is the method that I will use on Anselm’s ontological argument. Given that 
it breaks down the argument into very specific parts, it will let every nuance of 
the argument shine through in the analysis. 
 
Analysis 
This analysis will be focusing on the relevant sections of the second chapter of 
the Proslogion.  The second chapter is focused on the existence of X, therefore it 
is important to realise that in the argument Anselm chooses to call the subject of 
the argument “something than which nothing greater can be thought” and not 
God. In this analysis I will instead of using the term “something than which 
nothing greater can be thought”, use X. Anselm chooses to call X for some other 
name than God in order to remove some of the implicit meaning that the word 
God may hold is a rather interesting notion. By doing so it makes the argument 
more relatable to the fool, since they are merely debating whether or not an 
existence of X is possible, and not the existence of God. The word God is 
flooded with meaning and values that may cloud the argumentation with either 
an unwillingness to understand X or on the other hand an overly willingness to 
understand, a willingness that may not need logical proof. 
In reading Proslogion it is important to remember that the argument was not 
presented in present time, and that at the time it was written the church was not 
only a religion, but also a commanding and influential power. In the 11
th
 century 
the church reformed, and gradually the pope in Rome became the symbolic 
leader of the church (Europa 1000-1300, p. 96). The church was an authority, 
and religion was a cornerstone in the people’s lives, and it certainly had a much 
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more important role in their lives than the church has in most people’s lives 
today.  
In the second chapter of Proslogion Anselm tries to prove X’s existence in both 
the understanding and in reality. The proof of X’s existence in both reality and 
the understand is found by using reduction ad absurdum, which is an argument 
where the premises presented is self-contradicting and thereby logically 
inconsistent, in order to prove a point by showing the absurdity of the argument. 
The chapter contains 12 sections, and will be referred to as 2.1, 2.2 etc. If a 
section is further divided it will be shown as such; (2.1 – “therefor … them.”), 
this will mostly be used in the diagram of the argument, but may occur in the 
analysis.  
 
2.3:  
“And indeed <if we believe You to be something than which nothing 
greater can be thought.>” 
In 2.3 Anselm presents God as; “something than which nothing greater can be 
thought” which from now on will be known as X although 2.3 may seem as a 
conclusion due to the use of the word indeed, and the fact that Anselm basically 
says that we believe God to be X. However if 2.3 were to be the conclusion, it 
would be rather simple and faulty due to the lack of supporting reasons. Seen as 
Anselm’s argument is not simple minded, which is clear from Anselm’s very 
sophisticated ways of leading the fool into a linguistic and logic trap, by 
different argumentation throughout the argument. If however one were to take 
2.3 as a supposed characterisation of X, rather than a simple and unsupported 
conclusion, it becomes the beginning of the argument that follows.  
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2.6: 
“For it is one <thing for a thing to exist in the understanding,>  
and another <to understand a thing to exist.>” 
From here Anselm then states in 2.6 that there is indeed a difference between 
existing in reality and in the understanding. Here Anselm presents a reason that 
clarifies the distinction between existence in the understanding in reality and in 
the understanding. The inference indicator is circled, and as to why there are two 
circles is that the reason is presented in two sections. This is done by stating, 
”For it is one thing .. and another …”, so that the reader or the fool can see the 
very clear distinction between the two. This is a rather simple statement that 
may seem obvious to the reader, but Anselm uses the statement to lure the fool 
into the argument, because by now the fool is convinced that X exists in the 
understanding, but not in reality, which is assumed in 2.5, and concluded in 2.8. 
However in the following sections Anselm is working on defining existence in 
the understanding and the existence in reality, so that he may use those findings 
to trap the fool with logic later in the argument.  
2.8: 
“Thus, even the fool is convinced that there is in the understanding 
at least something than which nothing greater can be thought, 
because <he understands this when he hears it>, and <whatever is 
understood is in the understanding.>” 
The reasons, in 2.3 and 2.6, that the reader has gotten from the argument so far 
leads to the following intermediate conclusion in 2.8; “Thus, even the fool is 
convinced that there is in the understanding at least something than which 
nothing greater can be thought,…” Thus is circled because in this part of the 
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argument it functions as a conclusion indicator. In this case the intermediate 
conclusion is regarding the fool’s ability to understand the notion of the 
existence of X in the understanding. This intermediate conclusion is further 
backed by the following two reasons;”… because he understands this when he 
hears it,…” This is yet another opportunity to see how Anselm links the reasons 
supporting the conclusion together; “and whatever is understood is in the 
understanding.” The way he takes the reader from one simple step from another, 
ensures that the intended reader, the non-believer, is given no chance to lose 
sight of the strand of logic running throughout the argument. This intermediate 
conclusion is built on the assumption in 2.5 that fool understands the concept of 
X, an assumption that I cannot help but question. Just because one hears 
something, does not mean that one automatically understands it. However in this 
argument Anselm accepts the premise on behalf of the fool. It is rather 
interesting to see how in 2.3 it starts out with X being a thing we believe to be, 
then in 2.6 the term changes to exist. There is a rather huge difference between 
something that we believe to be, and for at thing to exist, even if it only exists in 
the understanding. This is one of things that lack explanation in the argument. 
2.10: 
“For <if it is in the understanding alone, it can also be thought to 
exist in reality, which is greater.>” 
In 2.10 Anselm introduces yet another premise for the fool, a premise that has 
great value to the argument, however the fool has to accept the premises in order 
for the argument to continue, which the fool seemingly does. The distinction 
between existence in reality and in the understanding, which the reader by now 
knows, is two very different things. Anselm uses the fact that the fool, 
supposedly, accepts both the distinction in the two kinds of existence and the 
14 
 
characterisation of X, which by now has shifted to that than which a greater 
cannot be thought. The acceptance of these things makes Anselm’s 2.10 an 
important piece in the argument; “For if it is in the understanding alone, it can 
also be thought to exist in reality, which is greater.” Given that the fool has 
accepted the statements mentioned above, this piece of logic becomes valid, 
since X is “that than which a greater cannot be thought” and from 2.10 it is clear 
that existence in reality is superior to existence in the understanding. That leads 
to the notion that X must exist in reality as well as in the understanding.  
2.11: 
“If therefore <if that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the 
understanding alone, that same thing than which a greater cannot be 
thought is [something] than which a greater can be thought.> But 
this cannot be the case.” 
However, before Anselm concludes that X exists in reality as well as in the 
understanding, he uses a technique in 2.11 that most philosophers is quite fond 
of; reductio ad absurdum. This is a technique where one constructs an argument 
with claims, which together are logically inconsistent, in order to show the 
absurdity in claiming any of them, thereby forcing the opponent, in this case the 
fool, to agree with the presenter, in this case Anselm. 
As mentioned earlier the fool has already accepted the assumptions leading up to 
this point of the argument, thereby making the argument valid. So at this stage 
the fool is pretty much bound by his own doing. So the fool must follow 
Anselm’s logic that by the use of the reductio ad absurdum makes Anselm’s 
intent perfectly clear. 
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In the reductio ad absurdum above Anselm starts out with presenting the first 
premise that the fool has accepted; the characterisation of X – “that than which a 
greater cannot be thought” in 2.3. So far, so good – in the eyes of the fool. Then 
Anselm brings the second premise that the fool also accepted in to the mix; X 
exists in the understanding alone in 2.8. So far the premises can still function 
together. Then the third premise the fool accepted is added to the mix; existence 
in reality is better than existence in the understanding in 2.10. This is when the 
argument starts to self-destruct, because if X is “that than which a greater cannot 
be thought”, it must also exist in reality, but the first premise goes against that. 
So when putting all three premises together the argument becomes logically 
inconsistent, and thereby creates the reductio ad absurdum.  
2.12: 
“Therefore without doubt something than which a greater cannot be 
thought exists, both in the understanding and in reality.” 
The reductio ad absurdum leads the reader to the final conclusion which is 
presented in 2.12. Again Anselm seems to think that the need to indicate the 
arguments strength, in the case of the final conclusion this indicator is without 
doubt. Is Anselm so sure in his own argument that a simple conclusion is simply 
not enough? Or perhaps it is rather a question of needing the fool to be 
completely convinced that the conclusion is correct, so that the argument is 
successful. At this point Anselm feels that he has irrevocably proven the 
existence of X both in reality and in the understanding by using logic.  
Diagram of Anselm’s ontological argument 
In this diagram one can see how my version of the stripped argument is. How 
2.3 and 2.6 jointly lead to the intermediate conclusion in 2.8, which is also 
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backed up by the two reasons that one can find within 2.8. The intermediate 
conclusion leads to 2.11, where 2.10 also leads to separately. From 2.11 comes 
the final conclusion in 2.12 
.
 
 
Discussion 
In this chapter I am going to focus on how the assumptions made by Anselm 
affect the argument, both in regard to soundness and validity. I will also be 
speculating whether or not these assumptions are reached as a result of his 
religious nature.  
Supposition1 (2.3) + Reason1  (2.6)   
Intermediate conclusion 
(2.8 – ”Thus … thought,”) 
 
 
Reason3 (2.8 – 
”because …it,”) 
Reason4 (2.8 – ”and 
…understanding.”) 
Hypothetical argument (Reductio ad absurdum) (2.11) 
Final conclusion (2.12) 
Supposition2 (2.10)  
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In 2.3 Anselm introduces the characterisation of X as “something than which 
nothing greater can be thought”. Anselm does not clarify as to why or in which 
way X is “something than which nothing greater can be thought”, but merely 
assumes that the characterisation as it is delivered is acceptable enough. In order 
for the argument to continue, the fool has to accept the characterisation of X, so 
for the sake of the argument he does. But would a real atheist accept the premise 
without further clarification? And what is in fact “something than which nothing 
greater can be thought”? Those would be perfectly reasonably questions to ask, 
but they are not asked on behalf of the fool in Anselm’s argument. 
Also in 2.5 Anselm assumes that because the fool hears it, he must understand it. 
But would he indeed have to understand it just because he hears it? I often hear 
things that I do not understand, so why should this not be the case with the fool? 
Since Anselm’s aim with the argument is to prove the existence of God through 
logic, then why not provide reasons as to why the fool should understand, and 
not just a statement saying that what the fool hears he understand and what he 
understand must by default be in his understanding? 
It is rather interesting to see how Anselm introduces the fool to the argument in 
order to show how to persuade a non-believer. However this non-believer seems 
to question only the things that Anselm seems to think relevant to his logic. It is 
as if Anselm finds the possibility of the fool not being able to comprehend X 
absurd, and therefore does not mention it. However is it not possible that the 
fool may not have been able to conceive the characterisation of X, since 
“something than which greater cannot be thought”, is quite comprehensive? I 
would say so. The characterisation of X may symbolise something different to 
different people, and therefore it is quite possible for the fool to be unable to 
conceive the characterisation of X.  
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Can it be that just because Anselm is articulated and able to create a situation 
where he is able to work logic in his favour, that he automatically is right? 
Anselm provides the fool, and the reader, with some premises that need to be 
accepted in order for the argument to be valid. However some of these premises 
are of some assumptions that lack backing. So Anselm cannot assume that the 
reader or the fool automatically would accept all of these premises. However the 
way that the fool is lured into to the argument, and slowly expected to accept 
one premise after another, is quite brilliant. Anselm slowly, but surely, gets the 
fool to dig his own grave by accepting the premises that lead up the reductio ad 
absurdum, and there Anselm shows the fool that his logic is inconsistent. Given 
that the fool is a fictional character created by Anselm, with some inspiration 
from scripture, it is also Anselm who accepts the premises on behalf of the fool, 
and since the thought of denying X is absurd to Anselm, he cannot possibly have 
the way of thinking that an atheist would have. Thereby Anselm does not think 
to object to some of the premises, to which an atheist probably would have 
objected. The fool is not a reliable counterpart to Anselm, given that the fool is 
but a fragment of Anselm’s imagination. However, there might exist an atheist 
that would accept the premises above, and by doing so that atheist would have 
no other choice but to accept the conclusion that Anselm reaches, if he were to 
accept all of the premises without any kind of objection.  
The reductio ad absurdum is dependent of the fool’s acceptance of three 
premises; first the fool needs to accept the characterisation of X, second that 
given the characterisations use of the word “greater” X cannot merely exist in 
the understanding and third it is better to exist in reality. So those would be the 
three premises that would absolutely need to be accepted in order for the 
argument to carry any validity what so ever. Leading up to premises two (2.8) 
and three (2.10), the fool, according to Anselm, accepts the characterisation of X 
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and that by hearing the characterisation he thereby understands it, resulting in 
X’s existence in his understanding. So at this point X only exists in the 
understanding, which is reached in the intermediate conclusion in 2.8. Unaware 
of the plot, one might say, the fool accepted the characterisation of X, and now 
Anselm postulates that that since it is “than which a greater cannot be thought” it 
cannot exist only in the understanding. Anselm backs this assumption with yet 
another assumption in 2.10 by stating that existing in reality is superior to 
existence in the understanding. However this assumption is not backed by any 
reasons. 
Anselm’s argument seems too open to interpretation and lacks that special 
something that would have me convinced that X truly does exist, and that the 
argument is not just a basic formula in which you can put everything in order to 
prove existence. I must agree with the critique that Gaunilo puts forward in his 
response to Proslogion, one can imagine an island, let us call it “An island 
which no island greater can be thought”. If one were to insert this island instead 
of X, would the argument then not still be valid? I do not think so, and when the 
argument is not valid, then it cannot be sound either. Based on the fact that one 
can switch basically anything with X, as long as it can be converted into a 
similar formulation as the characterisation of X, it is hard to consider the 
argument valid. The characterisation and the assumptions create a framework 
that is simply too weak.  
I would like to present an example of how Anselm’s argument can be used to 
prove the existence of another subject, to the same extent that Anselm proves 
X’s existence. 
Imagine a sea creature greater than any other sea creature, which can breathe 
flames and eats rabbits. Now that you have done that, the sea creature exists in 
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your mind, what Anselm would call the understanding. Ergo, you understand the 
sea creature to exist only in the mind. If I then were to point out the very 
important distinction between the sea creature existing in the mind and in the 
actual world to you, there would be no doubt about the differences between 
those two kinds of existence. You now understand the difference between the 
two ways of existence. If I then were to say as an example, that since it is always 
better to have the cookie, rather than to imagining to have the cookie, so based 
on that it must be better to exist in the actual world. Let us say that you were to 
agree with me, like Anselm’s fool does. Then the sea creature, which is greater 
than any other sea creature, must, given the characterisation of it, exist in the 
actual world, since it is better to exist there. Following that line of thought we 
have just proven the existence of this imagined creature, which we know does 
not exist. 
By using the theory from the analysis and Anselm’s own framework from the 
ontological argument, I have been able to construct this argument and prove to 
the same extent the existence of a being. However with this example it is quite 
obvious that the argument is not valid, and thereby not sound. 
 
Conclusion 
This project has taken the reader through the argumentation made by Anselm in 
the second chapter of Proslogion by analysing the argument put forward using 
Alec Fisher’s approach. Through that analysis it has become clear how Anselm 
was able to use logic to lure the fool in his argument to acknowledge the 
existence of X. Fisher’s approach to breaking down the argument into reasons, 
intermediate conclusions, hypothetical reasons, suppositions and final 
conclusions, is very helpful when it is a rather comprehensive argument that is 
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the subject of the analysis. The approach is intended for “real” arguments and 
not just for textbook examples of logic, so one might say that it is perfect for the 
argument at hand. 
After breaking the argument down to the basics, I was able to see the structure 
of the argument and thereby see if there were any problems with the validity of 
the argument, and from there on see whether or not the argument was sound. In 
order to see if the argument is valid one has to see if the conclusion follows from 
the premises presented in the argument. This presupposes that the premises are 
accepted, in this case the fool that Anselm intends to persuade accepts the 
premises leading him to the conclusion that X exists. However as mentioned in 
the discussion the fool is a fictional character whom Anselm is responsible of, so 
it is in fact Anselm self who accepts the premises, which could be considered to 
be a weakness to the argument. As to the validity of the argument, there is no 
doubt that, given the premises are in fact accepted as true by the reader, the 
argument is valid. In this case if the fool does in fact accept all of Anselm’s 
assumptions and intermediate conclusions, then the fool has no other choice but 
to accept the argument as valid. However that does not mean that the reader has 
to accept those premises. As I mentioned in the discussion I am not comfortable 
with accepting the premises that Anselm presents the fool with, because they are 
not backed probably with reasons. Anselm simply does not present any reasons 
that would make me accept the premises as they are in the argument. Had he 
provided some reasons for the assumptions, I might have been more inclined to 
accept them, but he did not.  
Seeing the argument stripped down and in its basic form the logic line of 
thought is clear, and as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the argument is totally 
reliable of the fool’s acceptance of the premises that Anselm put forward as 
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reasoning. However there is also the matter of whether or not the argument is 
sound. In this case I would say that the argument is not sound, one would only 
have to see the example that I put forward in the discussion chapter to 
understand that the structure of the argument may be valid, but given that one 
could use it to prove the existence of basically anything within the reach of one 
imagination, as long as one use the right phrasing in the characterisation. Then 
there is the fact that in order for the argument to be sound both the premises and 
the conclusion would have to be true, and as I mentioned earlier, I do not think 
that Anselm provided the reader with sufficient reasons. 
Since this is not a new discussion, not even remotely, there are many opinions 
on the topic. The debate of whether or not the argument proves the existence of 
X will probably never be irrevocably over, but for the time being I know where I 
stand. After having read the material and worked with this section of the 
argument, one cannot help but feel that the argument is not fully convincing in 
regard to the existence of X, which we by now can call God. The opposite side 
of the debate may very well say that the argument was not created for any other 
purpose other than to prove God’s existence, but from here the argument is not 
reliable due to the fact that it is so vague in the characterisation. The conclusion 
ends up being that although Anselm was extremely gifted in the art of using 
logic, he created an argument that might very well to some be valid, but I am not 
one of them.  
Source criticism 
The material that I have used in writing this project includes a translation, and 
with that comes the possibility of interpretation from the translator. The 
translation used is part of Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, where Ian Logan, the 
author, writes briefly about the translation used. Logan points out that; “There is 
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no such thing as definitive translation of a given text, precisely because there is 
no such thing as a definitive interpretation of a text.” (p.5) this is in general the 
problem with translations, some are very unreliable due to the paraphrasing 
whereas other try as best as they can to be true to the original text. The focus of 
the translation used in this project is to convey the philosophical meaning, and in 
order for the reader to follow the translation the original text is presented 
together with the translation. The translation itself is to the best of the 
translator’s abilities true to the original text. 
Ian Logan is the author of Reading Anselm’s Proslogion. He has a doctorate on 
Anselm of Canterbury from the University of Leeds. It is quite clear that Ian 
Logan is very passionate about Anselm and his writing, as Logan has a blog on 
the internet dedicated to it. One thing which might be problematic with Logan is 
that he tends to let his opinion shine through at times, and as the reader it is 
important to be critical of those segments.  
Alec Fisher (The logic of real arguments) proved to be rather difficult to obtain 
information about, so the information is gathered from a homepage from the 
University of the West Indies (UWI) regarding critical thinking. However the 
method and theory behind Fisher’s approach is widely used and taught, so even 
though it might be hard to find information about the man himself, the material 
that he has provided us with is indeed very usable.  
 
Abstract 
In this project I have worked with Anselm’s ontological argument, using Alec 
Fisher’s approach in order to find out whether or not the argument is valid. By 
breaking down the second chapter of the argument and dividing it into inference 
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indicators, reasons and conclusions, I was able to uncover the logic form of the 
argument. Through the analysis it becomes clear that Anselm’s argument is 
dependent of assumptions, which the fool needs to accept in order to make the 
argument valid.   
 
Summary 
I dette projekt har jeg arbejdet med Anselms ontologiske argument ved at 
benytte Alec Fishers fremgangsmåde for at vurdere, om argumentet fremstillet i 
kapitel 2 er gyldigt.  Ved at gennemgå kapitel 2 og markere indikatorer, 
begrundelser og konklusioner, afdækker jeg opbygningen af argumentet for at 
komme til bunds i argumentets logiske sammenhæng. Igennem analysen bliver 
det tydeligt, at Anselms argument er bygget på nogle antagelser, som 
modtageren, i dette tilfælde fæet, er nødt til at acceptere for, at argumentet bliver 
gyldigt. 
 
Dimensions 
I am seeking the Philosophy and Science dimension because of both the theory 
and the argument used in the project. Since the project concerns whether or not 
the argument is valid and sound it is within the field of philosophy.  
I am also seeking the dimension English due to the extent that the theory 
embarks on the analysis of the literary devices in the English language. The 
theory demands knowledge of the English language and how to use it in 
argumentation. 
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Appendix  
Appendix 1 – Context analysis of the other sections. 
2.1: 
“[That God truly exists.]”  
The chapter starts with 2.1, which is merely the chapter’s title, and not really 
part of the text. What is interesting with this title is that it states the following, 
“That God truly exists.” which is not what the chapter does. In the second 
chapter the only thing that is supposedly proven is that X exists, whereas further 
characterisation of X happens in the third and fourth chapter, where Anselm 
directs the reader’s attention to the fact that X and God’s existence is one and 
the same. So although the title gives an indication that the second chapter proves 
the existence of God, Anselm only tries to prove the existence of X in the 
second chapter and therefore the title is somewhat misguiding in regard to the 
second chapter.  
2.2: 
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“Therefore, Lord, You who grant understanding to faith, grant that I may 
understand (to the extent You consider it profitable) that You exists as we 
believe, and are that which we believe.” 
 
In 2.2 Anselm calls for the Lord to grant him understanding, and the way that 
the section is phrased shows that Proslogion is written as a prayer, much like 
Saint Augustine’s Confessiones, which is also written in a prayer-like tone. 
What both of the texts have in common is that even though the initial literary 
recipient may be God, there is another recipient, the reader, which in this case is 
the fool. Anselm directs Proslogion to God, and in some sections there are 
sentences that function as nothing more than praise. However in 2.2 Anselm 
gives a plan of attack concerning the following three chapters, “… grant that I 
may understand (to the extent You consider it profitable) that You exists as we 
believe and are that which we believe.” The underlined part tells the reader what 
will happen in the second chapter and the part in bold is what the third and 
fourth chapter is about. The third and fourth chapters will not be included in this 
analysis, other than a few clarifying mentions here and there. Section 2.2 starts 
out with an inference indicator, ‘therefore’, which serves as a conclusion 
indicator. The intermediate conclusion that is indicated is based on the prior 
chapter, and therefore will the reasons supporting that intermediate conclusion 
not be a part of this analysis or the linear form of the argument.  
2.4: 
“Or is there not anything of such a nature, since the fool has said in his heart, 
‘There is no God’?” 
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After having characterised X in 2.3, Anselm introduces the fool, or the atheist, 
who dares to question God’s existence, in 2.4. Yet again, it is interesting to think 
of the fact that Proslogion is written as a prayer, and that the fool is nothing 
more than an instrument to ask the question “Does God exist?” The reason as to 
why it is interesting that Anselm chooses to use the fool in the introduction of 
the main-issue is that since the argument is written as a prayer, it would not look 
good, at the time, for a man of God to ask such a critical question concerning 
God’s existence. So the fool creates the situation where Anselm finds the need 
to prove God’s existence to the nonbeliever, which is the point of the argument. 
Now that the problem or the intention with the argument has been presented by 
using the fool’s unwillingness to believe in God, the time has come for Anselm 
to persuade the fool to believe in God’s existence, and Anselm wants to reach 
the fool, not with quotations of scripture, but rather with logic, so that the fool 
cannot dismiss God’s existence. By introducing the fool Anselm lays the 
groundwork for the reductio ad absurdum that he puts forward in 2.11, because 
without the fool that formulation would not have been possible.  
2.5: 
“But surely <if this same fool, when he hears the very thing that I say, 
‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, understands what he 
hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he should not 
understand that it exists.>” 
In 2.5 Anselm starts out with assuming that the fool must understand what he 
hears, and thereby what he hears is in his understanding. It is very interesting to 
see how Anselm links together very small and simple steps in order to reach the 
point that he wants to end up at; “But surely this same fool, when he hears the 
very thing that I say, ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’,…” 
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I have underlined surely because I cannot help but notice that Anselm assumes 
that the fool understands the concept of something than which nothing greater 
can be thought, which in my opinion is not something that one can just expect 
the fool to comprehend. But let’s assume, for the time being, that the fool 
understands the characterisation of X. Anselm continues; “… understands what 
he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he should not 
understand that it exists.” In this part of 2.5 Anselm is at a point in the argument 
where the fool comprehends X’s existence in the understanding, but not in 
reality. However the fool is not totally dismissing the existence of X, since X 
can exist in the fool’s understanding. 
2.7: 
“For <when a painter thinks in advance of the things which he is about to make, 
he has that which he has not yet made in his understanding at least, even though 
he does not yet understand that it exists.> Once <he has painted it, he both has 
what he has now made in the understanding and understands that it exists.>” 
Anselm then creates a hypothetical example in 2.7 in order to show the fool the 
distinction between the two kinds of existence even more clearly. The example 
is about a painter and how when he thinks of creating an artwork, that artwork 
exists in his understanding, but not in reality. However when the painter has 
created the artwork, it exists both in reality and in the understanding. By using 
this analogy about the painter Anselm tries to justify the assumption made in 2.5 
about the fool understanding X to exist in the understanding, but not in reality 
and thereby the possibility of X’s existence in reality. 
2.9: 
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“And certainly <if that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be in the 
understanding alone.>” 
Then there comes yet another assumption in 2.9; “And certainly that than which 
a greater cannot be thought cannot be in the understanding alone.” Certainly is 
underlined due to the impact the word has in this section. By using a word that 
further implies the strength of the claim in the assumption Anselm seems very 
sure in his claim. However to be sure that the fool cannot argue that the 
assumption is faulty Anselm comes with more reasons to explain the assumption 
and thereby also to support the final conclusion when that is reached. 
Furthermore Logan points out that the pronoun shifts in the Latin version, from 
indefinite to definite (Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, p. 94). This could be an 
indication that Anselm is attributing further importance to X, since Anselm takes 
X from being something which is unknown and undefinable to something 
concrete, yet for the time being undefined. Even though X is undefined in the 
definite form, it has taken on a meaning and an air of something with a greater 
meaning, because it has gone from being something that we vaguely created in 
the understanding for the sake of the argument, to something definite and 
thereby existing. So one could say that X is developing with the argument, and 
that X has gone from being something that the fool was to imagine to being 
something that the fool believes to exist in the understanding. 
 
Appendix 2 – The argument 
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